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Abstract
We present a model of political campaigning where a candidate chooses between pro-
moting oneself (positive campaign) or attacking the rival (negative campaign). Candidates
vary only by quality. Campaign choices determine the subject of public deliberation: If a
candidate runs a positive campaign and his rival a negative campaign, the voters learn the
quality of the focalcandidate. Thus, negative campaigns may be used either to expose the
rival candidate (informative role) or to turn attention away from oneself (non-informative
role). The e¤ect of negative campaigns depends on whether it is faced with another negative
campaign (cross talk) or a positive campaign (fruitful debate). We suggest that in order to
ascertain the e¤ect of negative advertising, studies should take into account the campaigns
employed by both candidates. Voter beliefs about candidate quality plays a major role in
campaign selection: while the incidence of negative campaigning goes down as the prior
probability of a candidate being good increases, the probability of selection of the correct
candidate is non-monotonic in the said prior.
1 Introduction
Electoral campaigns are possibly the most important element of voters information about the
candidates. However, campaigns do not contain disinterested, impartial information. Candidates
choose their rhetoric strategically in order to inuence voter perception. One aspect of such
strategic choice that has received considerable attention both in the media and in the academy
I thank David Austen-Smith, Allen Brierly, Steve Callander, Joyee Deb, Alexandre Debs, Tim Feddersen,
Yuk-Fai Fong, Sean Gailmard, Bard Harstad, Jaehoon Kim, George Krause, Tapas Kundu, Marciano Siniscalchi,
seminar participants at MPSA conference (2006), Michigan State University and CIDE, Mexico for comments and
suggestions. I also acknowledge the hospitality and nancial support from Wallis Institute of Political Economy,
University of Rochester that I enjoyed while preparing part of the manuscript. Any error that remains in the paper
is my responsibility.
1
is the choice between positive and negative advertising: Whether to highlight ones own quality
or to focus on why the rival is unsuitable for o¢ ce. While every electoral campaign involves a
large number of positive, negative and (especially) comparative messages, we shall characterize
the overall theme of a campaign as broadly positive or negative, and it is the choice of this theme
that we shall examine in this paper.1
In this paper, we think of campaigns as public debates in which the voting public forms its
judgement about the candidates by comparing and contrasting their campaign statements. Thus,
the nature and extent of information revealed about candidates depends jointly on the campaign
themes chosen by both candidates. In particular, our main premise is that if one candidate decides
to highlight why he is suitable (positive campaign) and the other argues why his rival is unsuitable
(negative campaign), then the former candidate is the focal one in the electoral race: The public
learns more about quality of the former than about the latter one. This creates the main tension
that we study in the paper: Good candidates try to reveal information through focality and the
bad ones trying to avoid focality. The analysis borrows its basic idea from the literature on issue
choice in campaign rhetoric (Simon 2002, Kaplan et al 2006, and Egorov 2012): More information
is revealed about an issue if the two candidates discuss both sides of the issue rather than if only
one candidate presents his side of the issue. In this paper, we study the candidates decision to
focus on one of two decidedly aggregate issues: Matters pertaining to ones own suitability for
o¢ ce vs. those pertaining to the rivals quality. Such a model allows us to analyze conditions
under which negative advertising is used to inform the electorate or to muddle the debate.
Opinions are deeply divided regarding whether the practice of negative campaigning improves
or degrades the electoral process. While some view negative campaigns as essentially vicious mud-
slinging with the e¤ect of reducing turnout (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995, Ansolabehere et al
1994, 1999), destroying voterstrust in government and undermining the e¢ cacy of the political
system (Brader 2005), others (Geer 2006) have pointed out its role in providing genuine information
and disciplining the candidates, and even in stimulating turnout (Freedman and Goldstein 1999,
2002, Finkel and Geer 1998, Kahn and Kenney 1999, Wattenberg and Brians 1999). Over the
last two decades, there has been a profusion of empirical and experimental research examining
these e¤ects. However, in a meta-study covering 110 articles, dissertations and books published
on the topic between 1987 and 2007, Lau et al (2007) nds that there is no consensus in the
literature on the role of negative advertising (see also Lau et al 1999). All empirical or experimental
work aimed at uncovering the role of negativity in advertising has so far looked at the e¤ect of
individual messages/campaigns in isolation - our model postulates that we may get a clearer and
more nuanced picture if future work takes into account both the campaign themes (or messages)
1While some of the literature has looked at the role of individual messages, a large chunk of the empirical
literature has codedcampaigns as either primarily positive or primarily negative or the extent to which a whole
campaign is negative. Ansolabehere et al 1994, 1999, in their seminal study of turnout in 34 senate elections in
1992, use this binary characterization. Others (e.g., Brooks (2006) and Wattenberg and Brians (1999)) have used
the same data.
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in contention.
There is a wide variation in the denition of negative advertising employed in the literature.
At one extreme, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) equates negative advertising with mudslinging
and ad hominem attacks; and at the other extreme, Polborn and Yi (2006), henceforth referred to
as PY, has dened negative advertising exclusively as provision of valuable electoral information
about the rival candidate. We use a broad denition of negative and positive campaigns that
is adopted from Finkel and Geer (1998): [P]ositive appeals are ones that candidates o¤er to
promote themselves on some issue or trait; and Negative appeals are attacks [or criticism]
leveled at the opposition.While this denition literally applies to specic messages, we adjust
this denition for aggregate campaign themes. In our model, a positive campaign may contain
messages about ones own strength of character, values, records and arguments about why ones
position on di¤erent issues is close to that of the median voter. On the other hand, a negative
campaign may contain a series of messages regarding the opponents features (character aws,
vices, inconsistencies, past failures) and arguments why his political positions are not close to that
of the median voter. In sum, the crucial di¤erence between a positive and negative campaign
is whether the informational spotlight is focused on oneself or on the rival. According to this
denition, there is nothing inherently negative about talking about the rival (or positive about
focussing on oneself). However, it is never in the interest of a candidate to highlight his own
failings or his rivals virtues: Typically, self-focussed campaigns contain positive information and
rival-focussed campaigns contain negative information.
Given this categorization of campaign themes, whether negative advertising is useful or harmful
to the voter arises endogenously from candidate choices. When one candidate goes positive and
the other negative, the former candidates quality is the focal issue: The candidates engage in an
active debate about this issue. The voters learn about the focal candidate by comparing claims and
counterclaims. Most of the pre-electoral discussions in the public sphere are centered on the focal
candidate. Three recent examples of focal candidates in high prole elections are Barack Obama
in the American Presidential Election of 2008, Narendra Modi in the Indian parliamentary (Lok
Sabha) election of 2014, and Donald Trump in the Republican Primary for the 2016 American
Presidential race. Compared to the focal candidate, a lot less is learnt about the rival in such
elections. Not every election has a focal candidate, however. If both candidates run positive
campaigns or both employ negative campaigns, they are essentially talking past each other.
There is a lot less issue engagement in this case. Since there are only one-sided claims which are
less credible, the voters learn a lot less about either candidate in this case.
As the campaign watchdog, the media has an important role to play in our story. Following PY,
we think of the candidates as setting the agenda for the media through their choice of campaign
themes. The media checks the veracity of statements made by the candidates, compares claims
and counterclaims and produces a judgement on the issue being debated. Given the constraints on
the time, space and resources of the media, fact-checking more e¢ cient when there is concentrated
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engagement about one candidate rather than a di¤used discussion about both candidates.
Scholars studying American political campaigns have long stressed the need for issue engage-
ment (or dialogue) for enabling the voting public to make an informed decision. Berelson et al
(1954), Kelley (1960), and more recently Petrocik (1996) and Sellers (1998) document and bemoan
the tendency of candidates to talk past each other. Simon (2002) denes dialogue occurs only
when two candidates address the same subject ... the opposite of dialogue is ignoring, responding
by discussing a di¤erent subject. Emphasizing that the level of dialogue approximates the qual-
ity of the campaign, he goes on to observe that the decision to dialogue can be construed as a
strategic choice. This strategic choice is formally modelled by Simon (2002), Kaplan et al (2006)
and Egorov (2012) where they assume that voters learn more about issues over which candidates
choose to engage in a dialogue. Simon (2002) and Kaplan et al (2006) also estimate the extent of
dialogue over di¤erent issues in several empirical and laboratory settings. In the current paper,
we extend the logic of issue choice to the specic case of positive vs. negative campaign themes.
Geer (2006), in his detailed historical study of American Presidential campaigns, informally
makes an argument similar in spirit to what has been modeled in this paper. While positive
campaigns allow candidates to talk past each other and voters would assume innocence un-
less proved guilty, negative campaigns carry the risk of being caught making unsubstantiated
charges (Geer, 2006; page 51). We allow, in addition, the possibility that even negative cam-
paigns, when carried on by both sides, may not reveal much information either.
This paper takes seriously the fact that candidates often spend large amount of resources on
espionage. Even if a candidate himself is well-known to the voting public, there may be aspects
about his suitability to o¢ ce that are not always well known. Thus, each campaign spends time
and money in nding negative information about the rival. Such e¤orts capture a range of things
from researching the rival candidates voting records and personal history to privately polling
sections of the electorate in order to nd out about how the public views the rivals positions on
salient issues. We embed in our model two features of such espionage: First, it is costly, and
second, it is almost always clandestine.2
1.1 Model: Brief Discussion
In our formal model, each of the two candidates has a privately known quality - either good or bad.
At the beginning of the campaign, each candidate has the option to learn about the quality of the
rival by investing a cost. Armed with information about their own quality and possibly the rivals
quality, candidates commit to a campaign theme: Positive or negative. Such precommitment
is a simplifying assumption made in order to ignore the dynamic aspect of campaigns where a
candidate makes counter-claims in response to the rivals claims, and is entirely standard in the
2For instance, here is an article about clandestine political espionage network for the Republican cause:
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/the-koch-brothers-intelligence-agency-215943
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literature on issue choice. In the model, we blackbox the actual process of voter opinion formation
in what we call the information revelation protocol. If one candidate chooses a positive campaign
and the other a negative one, we say that there is a fruitful debate. Otherwise, there is cross talk. In
case of a fruitful debate, the candidate whose quality is discussed is said to be focal while the other
candidate is non-focal. In case of cross-talk, neither candidate is focal. In our benchmark case,
we assume a deterministic information revelation protocol : A candidates true quality is revealed
if and only if he is focal, and the campaign reveals no information about non-focal candidates. In
a latter extension, we assume a probabilistic information revelation protocol : The quality of focal
the candidate is revealed with a higher probability than that of the non-focal candidate. Voters
vote based on information revealed through the protocol under consideration. All voters have the
same preference and prefer to vote for the good rather than the bad candidate.
Given the information revelation protocol, if a good candidate is facing a bad candidate, the
former would prefer that either candidate be focal while the latter would prefer that neither is
focal. This means that the two candidates have opposite preferences over message proles: The
good candidate prefers to go positive (negative) when the bad candidate goes negative (positive),
and the bad candidate prefers to go positive (negative) when the good candidate goes positive
(negative), leading to a matching pennies game between the good and bad types. Since the bad
candidate wants to hide (conceal information) and the good candidate wants to chase (reveal
information), we title the competitive process of information provision as a hide-and-seek game.
The unique equilibrium outcome of this game describes candidate behavior and determines the
extent of information revealed in electorate.
The introduction of uncertainty between candidates and the option of costly search is a cru-
cial innovation in this paper. Between-candidate uncertainty captures a fundamental asymmetry
between positive and negative campaigns that cannot be obtained in models which start out as-
suming that candidates know about each others type (e.g., PY). While information used in a
positive campaign is free for a candidate, truth in a negative campaign is obtainable only through
costly research. As a consequence, positive campaigns contain more information than negative
campaigns.
1.2 Main Results
Because of incomplete information between candidates, the votersprior belief about a candidate
being good plays a major role in determining the nature of debate. Using this prior as a proxy for
average (expected) candidate quality, we focus on understanding the strategic behavior of candi-
dates as a function of expected candidate quality. The model conrms the conventional wisdom
that the incidence of negative advertising increases as the average quality worsens. However, the
hide-and-seek nature of the race provides an advantage to the rarertype. In particular, a good
candidate can most e¤ectively reveal his type through positive advertising when the average can-
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didate quality is low and there is a lot of negative campaigning. At the other extreme, when the
average candidate quality is very high, all candidates engage in more positive campaigning: But
this allows the bad candidates to e¤ectively hideby avoiding debate with the good types. Thus,
while an electorate with low expected candidate quality is competitive but e¢ cient for the purpose
of candidate selection, one with a high average quality is ine¢ cient. Consequently, voter welfare
in terms of the ex-post expected quality of the winning candidate may actually go down with an
increase in the ex-ante expected candidate quality.
The model also allows us to talk about a novel role of campaign resources. Snyder 1989, for
example, examines the role of campaign resources in nding information about the opponent.
The search cost can be seen as an index of the extent of asymmetry in information between the
candidates. While a lowering of this cost improves the information content of negative advertising,
we show that the bad type has a stronger incentive to engage in search than the good type.
Therefore, the expected welfare of the voter is not monotonic in the cost of search. In particular,
if a social planner could selectthe cost of search in order to maximize the probability of correct
selection, then she would set the cost to zero when the good type is more common and set the
cost very high when the bad type is more common. Similarly, the voters welfare is not monotonic
in the payo¤ from winning o¢ ce.
1.3 Related formal work
As mentioned before, the current paper brings together two strands of theoretical work on political
campaigns: One on issue engagement and the other on positive vs. negative advertising. Simon
(2002) presents a model where candidates allocate an advertising budget over many issues, and
shows that each candidate has an incentive to emphasize a di¤erent set of issues rather than
engaging in a dialogue with the rival on any given issue. According to Simon, a dialogue can be
expected on an issue only if (i) it has overriding salience, (ii) mass media forces dialogue, or (iii)
candidates behave irrationallyfor whatever reason. Kaplan et al (2006) introduces uncertainty
about voter preferences over candidatespositions and obtains dialogue in Simons model in a
mixed strategy equilibrium. In our model, the between-candidate uncertainty performs a similar
role as candidate uncertainty about voter preferences in Kaplan et al (2006) and leads to fruitful
debate in equilibrium.
Earlier formal work on choice between positive and negative advertising (Skaperdas and Grof-
man 1995, Harrington and Hess 1996) takes as primitive an inuence functionthat assumes that
negative advertising reduces support both for its sponsor and target.3 Skaperdas and Grofman
(1995) nds that the trailing candidate engages in more negative advertising than the frontrunner,
and Harrington and Hess (1996) nds that the candidate with less attractive personal attribute
3Desposato (2008) studies the incidence of negative advertising in Latin American countires in a comparative
perspective by using similar inuence functions.
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runs a more negative campaign. In the equilibrium of our model too, the bad candidate is
weakly more likely to engage in a negative campaign than the goodcandidate (and strictly so
unless the prior expected candidate quality is very high).
PY considers a signaling model where candidates rationally choose the campaign theme and
voters infer candidate quality by observing the chosen theme.4 The authors nd that a candidate
uses a negative campaign when he either does not have too much to say about himself or he knows
that his opponent is very bad. While these authors assume that negative advertising contains only
hard information and is therefore always informative, our framework accounts for both goodand
badmotivations for attack by considering softer information. Consequently, these two models
generate opposite empirical predictions about the e¤ectiveness of negative advertising.
PY nds that in an environment where most candidates are expected to run negative cam-
paigns, when a candidate runs a negative campaign against one running a positive campaign, the
former is more likely to win. We obtain the exactly opposite conclusion: In such an environment,
the positive campaigner has an advantage. In our model, when the expected candidate quality is
very low, the bad types use negative campaigns to turn the focus on the rival - but this allows the
rare good type the opportunity to create focality by running a positive campaign.
We also show that the full knowledge of rival type assumed in PY does not hold, even for very
small search costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the benchmark model
in which the candidates are either goodor badand Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium.
Section 4 discusses how candidate behavior in the benchmark case changes as the prior belief and
the search cost change, and analyses welfare implications. Section 5 presents a few extensions and
Section 6 concludes the main body of the paper. Appendix A discusses an extended version of the
model with voter inference and a more general type space. Most proofs are in Appendix B.
2 Basic Model: Binary Types
There are two players: Candidates 1 and 2 with a private quality i; (i = 1; 2): Quality i can be
either Good (G) and Bad (B):5 For both candidates, quality follows a commonly known Bernoulli
distribution with the prior probability of a good type  2 (0; 1): The candidates run campaigns
(positive or negative) which reveal information to a voter about quality, based on which she votes
for one of the two. While the voter is not modeled explicitly as a player, her actions based on
the revealed information are taken into account in the payo¤s arising from candidate actions. In
4Mattes (2008) is a very similar model with choice between informative advertising on two dimensions: negative
vs. positive and issue vs. character.
5The qualityof a candidate can be thought of in two ways. In a common values framework where all voters
have the same preference, quality captures all characteristics that voters care about. In a private values framework
where the two candidates can be assigned two locations on the left-right ideological continuum, quality can simply
be thought of as the distance of a candidates location from the median voters ideal point.
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appendix A we show exactly the same conclusions hold when we formally model the voter as a
player.
2.1 Actions
Player i has two di¤erent action choices: The campaign actionMi 2 fP;Ng and the search action
Xi 2 fS;NSg: P denotes a positive campaign and N denotes a negative one. If player i undertakes
action S (search), he gets to know the type of his rival  i with certainty. If action NS (no search)
is taken, the rivals type is not known. One can think of the search action as being taken before
the campaign choice, so that the message can be conditioned on the information obtained through
search. We assume that the search action itself is private, i.e., a candidate cannot detect whether
the rival has searched or not. Thus, the search stage and the debate stage can be considered
simultaneous from the strategic point of view. Campaign choices by the candidates are also, in
the same sense, strategically simultaneous: We assume that a candidate cannot condition his
choice of message on the message chosen by the other candidate.6 The campaign prole is denoted
by M = fM1;M2g; the search prole by X = fX1; X2g and the type prole by  = f1; 2g:
Campaigns are thought of as public debates. The payo¤ to player i from an action and type
prole fM;X;g is assumed to be the payo¤ ui(M;) from debate less the cost of search, which
is c > 0 ifXi = S and zero otherwise. The payo¤ from debate ui(M;) depends on the information
revelation protocol. The winner of the debate gets a payo¤ w > 0; while the one who loses the
debate gets a payo¤ of 0: We normalize w = 2:
The search cost c is an index of how easy it is for a candidate to nd out detailed information
about the other candidate: In this sense it measures the extent of asymmetry of information
between candidates. Since the payo¤ from winning the debate has been normalized, in e¤ect, c
captures the ratio of the actual cost of search to the payo¤ from winning o¢ ce. Thus, an increase
in the importance of the contested o¢ ce (with the di¢ culty of nding information about the rival
remaining the same) would imply a drop in search cost. In the paper, we restrict c to lie in the
range
 
0; 1
2

: In this range, we show that search occurs in equilibrium for moderate values of the
prior  2 (c; 1   c): While the case with c > 1
2
can easily be covered by the model, we do not
formally study this case since there is no information acquisition for any prior belief over candidate
quality in equilibrium (please see footnote 8).
2.2 Information Revelation Protocol
The campaign can be thought of as a public debate that reveals information to the voter. The
actual process of debate is not modeled: We assume a protocol which determines how information
6Since the campaign theme is part of the broader campaign strategy which is determined in advance (rather
than tactics which can change as the campaign progresses), the simultaneity of message choice is not too bad an
assumption to start with.
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about candidate types is revealed to the voter depending on the campaign prole. If one candidate
goes positive and the other goes negative (i.e.,M1 6= M2), then the former candidate is focal in the
sense that his quality is subject to a fruitful debate. If on the other hand, there is cross talk, i.e.,
if M1 = M2; there is no focal candidate. We assume that a focal candidates quality is revealed to
the voter and a non-focal candidates quality is not.
A focal candidate wins the election if he is revealed to be good and loses the election if he is
revealed to be bad. If there is cross talk, the winner is chosen randomly with equal probability.
Although simplistic, such a passive voter response to debate works for a two-type case because
if one candidate is revealed to be good (bad), the other candidate cannot be better (worse). In
Appendix A, we show that if we include the voter as a rational player in the game, such passive
voting strategies considered here arise as equilibrium behavior. Assume that the winner of the
debate (i.e., whoever the voter votes for) gets a payo¤normalized to 2: In this constant sum game,
the utility from debate u1(M;) for player 1 is given by the following table, and that for player 2
is u2(M;) = 2  u1(M;):
u1(P; P;) = u1(N;N;) = 1;
u1(P;N;G; 2) = u1(N;P; 1; B) = 2;
u1(P;N;B; 2) = u1(N;P; 1; G) = 0;
The rather extreme assumption that the media reveals the true type of the focal candidate
and reveals nothing otherwise is not necessary for the qualitative results of the model. It has
been made for technical convenience so as to be able to drive the basic point home without using
unnecessary parameters. In section 5 we discuss the results in a generalized model where this
extreme assumption is relaxed while retaining the feature that a claim reveals information with a
higher probability if it is faced with a counter-claim. In that section, we use a probabilistic (rather
than deterministic) information revelation protocol which assumes that (1) in a fruitful debate,
the quality of the focal candidate is revealed with a higher probability than the non-focal one, and
(2) the probability that the voter learns neither candidates type is higher under cross talk than
under a fruitful debate.
2.3 Incentives
To understand the incentives that such a payo¤ structure creates, it is useful to describe them
in a normal form. There are three possible situations, depending on whether a good type faces
a good type, a bad type faces another bad type, or whether the two candidates are of di¤erent
types. Each case is described in a separate 2 2 matrix, with the row players payo¤ shown in the
matrix.
9
B-type
P N
P 1 2G-type
N 2 1
G-type
P N
P 1 2G-type
N 0 1
B-type
P N
P 1 0B-type
N 2 1
Suppose for now the candidates knew each others types. Then they would know which one of
the above three situations they were in. If a good candidate were facing another good candidate,
then it is strictly dominant for both to run a positive campaign: Both players would want to
discuss their own qualities. If a bad candidate were facing another bad one, then it is strictly
dominant to use a negative campaign: Neither player wants the focus on himself. When a good
candidate faces a bad candidate, there is a matching pennies game: The good candidate wants to
reveal information about either candidate: Thus he wants either to be focal himself (P;N) or the
rival to be focal (N;P ). The bad candidate, on the other hand, wants to conceal information by
inducing cross talk (P; P ) or (N;N). What makes this game interesting is that there is incomplete
information about the rivals type, and each candidate has an incentive to invest in research about
the rivals quality before deciding the campaign theme.
At this point, two comments are in order about the assumptions of the model.
In a formal sense, the campaign choiceMi by candidate i 2 f1; 2g is amessage about his private
information i: There are two traditions in economics about the relationship between messages
and private information, and both have been applied to the analysis of political advertising. At
one extreme, messages are thought to be cheap talk, i.e., completely unveriable (Prat 2004). At
the other extreme, messages are considered to be completely veriable signals about private
information, and therefore by denition truthful (PY). We recognize that while the content of
candidate statements often carry valuable information about candidate types, such statements
also include half-truths, unveriable claims and outright lies. Even a fact-checking media may not
always be able to ascertain the truth in all cases. We therefore assume that messages are only
conditionally veriable, i.e., i is revealed only when Mi = P and M i = N: One interpretation
could be that there is always two kinds of information about a candidate: Positive information
and negative information. Very often, both kinds of information have to be weighed against each
other to have full picture of the quality of a candidate. Such a complete assessment cannot be
obtained if both sides of the same issue are not debated by the candidates.
We assume that search by one candidate about the others quality is private. There are
two restrictions embedded in this assumption. First, while deciding on the campaign theme, a
candidate does not know whether his rival has found the relevant information to ascertain his
quality. Second, when there is a fruitful debate, the voting public cannot distinguish whether the
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negative facts about the focal candidate were unearthed by the media or the rival candidate or
were simply revealed through the process of debate. See footnote 9 for how the results would
change when search is still a costly option, but a candidate is aware of whether the rival searched
or not.
3 Equilibrium and its properties
The equilibrium concept considered here is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Formally, the strategy set
for type  2 fG;Bg of a candidate i 2 f1; 2g consists of the following three elements:
1. pi() : probability of search.
2. qi() : probability of using a positive campaign (P ) conditional on not searching
3. ri(; 
0) : probability of type  of candidate i using a positive campaign (P ) conditional on
searching, and discovering candidate j to be of type 0
From the previous discussion, we must have ri(G;G) = 1 and ri(B;B) = 0 (strictly dominant
strategies). In the rest of the paper, with a slight abuse of notation, ri(G) denotes ri(G;B) and
ri(B) denotes ri(B;G).7
It is useful to dene Pi(; 
0) as the (unconditional) probability of the event that type  of
candidate i faces type 0 of candidate j; and candidate i uses the positive campaign. This uncon-
ditional probability is the sum of two terms: (i) the probability that type  of player i searches
and uses a positive campaign, discovering the rival to be of type 0; and (ii) the probability that
type  of player i does not search and employs a positive campaign conditional on not searching.
Pi(; 
0) = pi()ri(; 
0) + (1  pi())qi(); where ; 0 = G;B (1)
Expanding on equation (1); we dene:
Pi(B;G) = pi(B)ri(B) + (1  pi(B))qi(B)
Pi(G;B) = pi(G)ri(G) + (1  pi(G))qi(G)
(2)
Lemma 1, which deals with campaign choice for each type of candidate conditional on available
information, brings out the hide-and-seek nature of the game.
Lemma 1 For  2 fG;Bg and i = 1; 2, the campaign choice qi() conditional on not searching,
and the campaign choice ri() conditional on nding the rival type to be di¤erent from own type,
are determined as follows:
7Thus, in the rest of the paper, ri() denotes the probability of type  of player i employing a positive campaign
on discovering ppalyer j to be of type fG;Bgn:
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(a) On nding the rival to be a bad type, the good type uses a positive campaign (ri(G) = 1) if
P i(B;G) < 12 and a negative campaign (ri(G) = 0) if P i(B;G) >
1
2
: Conditional on not
searching, the good type employs a positive campaign (qi(G) = 1) if Pr(B)  P i(B;G) < 12
and a negative campaign (qi(G) = 0) if Pr(B)  P i(B;G) > 12 ; where Pr(B) = 1  :
(b) On nding the rival to be a good type, the bad type uses a positive campaign (ri(B) = 1) if
P i(G;B) > 12 and a negative campaign (ri(B) = 0) if P i(G;B) <
1
2
: Conditional on not
searching, the bad type employs a positive campaign (qi(B) = 1) if Pr(G)  P i(G;B) > 12
and a negative campaign (qi(B) = 0) if Pr(G)  P i(G;B) < 12 ; where Pr(G) = :
Proof. See Appendix B.
According to Lemma 1, the campaign choice of a good type of player i depends only on
P i(B;G); the probability with which she expects a bad type of the rival to employ the positive
campaign against her. If the bad type goes positive with a high probability, the good type prefers
to go negative and expose the bad type, and if the bad type goes negative with a high probability,
the good type prefers to go positive and reveal her own type. In the same way, the message of the
bad type of player i depends only on P i(G;B); the probability that the good type of the rival
uses a positive campaign against him. The bad type always prefers to avert a fruitful debate with
the good type, and therefore tries to mimic the latters campaign choice. As an implication of
Lemma 1 part (a), conditional on not searching, the good type has a strictly dominant campaign
choice (P ) if it is the more common type. Similarly, Lemma 1 part (b) implies that conditional
on not searching, the bad type nds it strictly dominant to choose a negative campaign (N) if the
bad type is more common. In other words,
 > 1
2
) qi(G) = 1
 < 1
2
) qi(B) = 0
)
; i = 1; 2 (3)
Proposition 1 demonstrates the equilibrium behavior of candidates.8
Proposition 1 The game admits a unique equilibrium. For i = 1; 2; the equilibrium quantities
for di¤erent values of the prior  are as follows:
(i) If  < c; there is a fully separating equilibrium where no type searches, the good type uses the
positive campaign and the bad type attacks, i.e., pi(G) = pi(B) = 0; qi(G) = 1; qi(B) = 0;
and (o¤ equilibrium), ri(G) = ri(B) = 1:
(ii) If  2 (c; 1   c); there is a partially separating equilibrium where both types search with
positive probability, i.e., pi(G) = 12(1   c); pi(B) = 12(1 + c1 ):The good type employs a
8We do not consider the case  = c since it is non-generic. In this case, we can have a continuum of equilibria.
However, the equilibria discussed in the proposition extended to c !  still exist in the limit c = : The case of
 = 1  c is not considered due to the same reasons.
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positive campaign when she does not search and a negative campaign when she searches and
nds the rival to be a bad type, i.e., qi(G) = 1; and ri(G) = 0: The bad type employs a
negative campaign when he does not search and a positive campaign when he searches and
nds the rival to be a good type, i.e., qi(B) = 0 and ri(B) = 1:
(iii) If  > 1  c there is a fully pooling equilibrium where both types send the positive campaign
and neither type searches, i.e., pi(G) = pi(B) = 0; qi(G) = qi(B) = 1; and (o¤ equilibrium),
ri(G) = 0; ri(B) = 1:
Proof. See appendix B.
Notice that the unique equilibrium is type-symmetric in the sense that the same type of both
players employ the same strategy in equilibrium. From now on, we shall drop the index i from
the relevant variables while discussing the playersstrategies.
If either type is too rare (when  < c or  > 1   c), then there is no incentive for search,
and each candidate acts as if the rival is of the common type. When  < c; the bad type nds it
strictly dominant to employ a negative campaign (by equation (3)). The action of the bad type
is predictable, i.e., P (B;G) = 0; and by Lemma 1 part (a), the good type employs a positive
campaign: Thus, when expected candidate quality is very low, we have a competitiveelectorate,
there is a lot of negative advertising, but the good type can always separate itself from the bad
type by ensuring a fruitful debate. At the other extreme, when  > 1   c; the good type always
goes positive (equation (3)), and Lemma 1 part (b) dictates that then the bad type will use a
positive campaign too, and successfully ensure cross talk. Therefore, when the expected candidate
quality is very high, we have a conservativeelectorate, where there is only positive advertising,
and it is impossible to distinguish the good type from the bad. Notice that the no-search case
demonstrates that the rarer type has the advantage in the hide-and-seek game.9
Search is undertaken only when neither type is very rare, i.e., the expected candidate quality
is moderate (c <  < 1   c). The good candidate always provides arguments supporting himself
(positive campaign) unless he is sure that the rival is a bad type, in which case he tries to
expose the rival by going negative. The bad candidate on the other hand has a default campaign
which is negative, but when he is sure that the rival is a good type, he tries to ensure cross talk
by defending himself (positive campaign), hoping that the rival has not searched and is going to
employ a positive campaign too. This equilibrium is supported by the fact that the good candidate
searches less frequently than the bad type.
To see the technical intuition for the equilibrium with search, notice that if a candidate were to
engage in costly search with any positive probability, he must play di¤erent actions with di¤erent
types of the rival. Since the good type plays P if the rival is also good, he must play N when
9If c > 12 ; then we have either  < c or 1    < c; and in the same way as proposition 1(i) and 1(iii), there is
no search. For  < 12 ; the equilibrium is fully separating with the good type going positive and the bad type going
negative; and for  > 12 ; the equilibrium is fully pooling with both types going positive.
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search reveals the rival to be bad, i.e., r(G) = 0: In the hide-and-seek game with the bad type, the
good type does not want to play the same action against the bad type all the time. Hence, the
good type uses P conditional on not searching and N conditional on searching and discovering the
rival to be bad. Similarly, the bad type has r(B) = 1 and q(B) = 0: The search probabilities are
chosen by each type so as to keep the othertype indi¤erent between searching and not searching:
Search thus performs the role of mixing between the two di¤erent actions in the hide-and-seek
game.
As demonstrated by the above proposition, irrespective of whether search occurs or not, when
two good candidates are in competition, there is cross talk with both candidates arguing in support
of themselves (positive campaign). When two bad candidates face each other, we again have cross
talk, but with negative campaigns if  < 1  c and with positive campaigns otherwise: A fruitful
debate can occur only between a good and a bad type.
Although we have considered mechanisticor passive voting, including the voter as a rational
player does not alter this equilibrium. First, note there is nothing more to learn from cross-talk
by way of Bayesian inference because both candidates take the same action. As long as there is
a common prior over both candidates, it is rational for the voter to randomly choose the winner.
In equilibrium, fruitful debate occurs only between two di¤erent types of candidates - thus the
passive action is again rational. We make the additional assumption that o¤ the equilibrium, if
the voter observes a candidate to be of a type that is not supposed to be observed in equilibrium
(e.g., type B in the case  < c), then the voter assumes that each type of the rival candidate has
a small (not necessarily equal) positive probability of having played N; which implies that there
remains an uncertainty about the type of the rival. Thus, o¤ the equilibrium path too, the voter
strictly prefers to vote for the candidate revealed to be good and against the candidate revealed
to be bad. Therefore, the naivevoting action hardwired in the payo¤s does not change if we
include a rational voter in the model. Voter inference is formally discussed in Appendix A.
3.1 Properties of Search
A few properties of search are worth mentioning here:
1. Given the equilibrium campaign strategies, search has the property of strategic substitutabil-
ity: Certain search by one type takes away the incentive of the other type to search. More-
over, the type that does not search can mix messages in such a way as to nullify the infor-
mational advantage of the type that has searched. Therefore, no candidate searches with
certainty, even if search cost is very low. The result that search must be probabilistic casts
doubt over the assumption of full information between candidates which is assumed in PY.10
10The result that search is always probabilistic depends on the assumption that search is private. In a model
where each candidate knows whether the rival has searched or not and can make their campaign choice conditional
on such information, search is never probabilistic: for all parameter values in a type-symmetric equilibrium, a given
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2. Search is reciprocal, i.e., if one candidate searches with a positive probability, the other does
so too.
3. If search occurs, the bad type searches with a higher frequency than the good type. In the
equilibrium with search, we must have p(B) > 1
2
> p(G): Notice that the ex-ante marginal
value of positive advertising is higher to the good type than the bad. It is this advantage
that depresses the good types incentive to search, and raises the bad types motivation for
the same. The cost of search drives a wedge between the incentives to search of the two
types: For any given  for which search is worthwhile in equilibrium; p(B)  1
2
and 1
2
  p(G)
are both increasing in c: This leads to an ine¢ ciency which we discuss later in the discussion
on candidate selection. To drive the point home further, note that as c! 0; both p(B) and
p(G) converge to 1
2
and the ine¢ ciency due to search vanishes in the limit.
3.2 Campaigns and candidate quality
There is a large empirical/experimental literature discussing the e¤ect of negative advertising.
The main nding is that attack advertising hurts both the sponsor and the target of the negative
campaign, although there is considerable disagreement on the relative and absolute size of this
e¤ect. Recent formal work by PY and Mattes (2008) has provided a theoretical foundation for
these e¤ects by studying voter inference of candidate qualities from their campaign strategies. The
most important issue highlighted in the current paper is that information about candidate quality
is revealed by the prole of campaign choices rather than the choice by an individual candidate:
A negative campaign may have very di¤erent e¤ects depending on whether it is met by a positive
or a negative campaign.
3.2.1 Campaign proles and Information Revelation
The prole of campaigns reveal information to the voter directly through the information revelation
protocol, and additionally through equilibrium inferences. To analyze voter inference, one really
has to look at the voter as a rational player. We have informally discussed earlier and formally
demonstrated in appendix A that the equilibrium strategies derived in this section can be used to
analyze voter inference of candidate types from campaign choices.
A fruitful debate reveals the true quality of the focal candidate. Moreover, the rival candidates
type can also be inferred with certainty by the rational voters. In equilibrium, a fruitful debate
can occur only between opposite types: Such a debate has either a good candidate exposinga
bad one, or a good candidate successfully defending herself against attacks by a bad one.
In case of cross talk, there is no new information revealed directly through debate. In equilib-
rium, voters cannot distinguish between the two candidates as they are observed to take the same
type either serches or does not search. Mixing happens at the level of campaign choice.
15
action. However, we can talk about the e¤ect of campaign choice in terms of whether the prior,
i.e., expected candidate quality is updated upwards or downwards. When there is cross talk with
positive campaigns, either or both of the candidates must be good. On the other hand, when both
candidates use negative campaigns, at least one of the two candidates must be bad, and voters
adjust their assessment downwards. This feature of equilibrium leads to voter inferences under
cross talk discussed below.
Formally, suppose both candidates choose the same campaign M1 = M2 = M 2 fP;Ng;and
the inferred probability of the candidates being good is b(M). Then,
1. If  2 (c; 1   c), then b(N) < min; 1
2
	
i.e., when both candidates employ negative
campaigns, the assessment of candidate quality goes down. In fact, irrespective of the prior ;
the voters believe that both the candidates are more likely to be bad than good. The opposite
conclusions hold when each candidate runs a positive campaign, i.e., b(P ) > max; 1
2
	
:
2. If  > 1   c there is full pooling: The campaign choice is completely uninformative about
quality, and thus b(P ) = :
3. If  < c; we have full separation. Then, anyone using a positive campaign distinguishes
himself as a good type while anyone attacking the rival in debate reveals himself to be a bad
type. Formally, in this case, b(N) = 0.
3.2.2 E¤ect of Negative Advertising
In order to compare our results directly with the existing literature on negative campaigns, we
now turn to the following question: Suppose a candidate is observed to run a negative campaign.
What e¤ect does our model predict about the sponsor and the target? The answer, in our model,
depends on what campaign the target is observed to run. If the rival also goes negative, the
expected quality of both the target and the sponsor goes down. On the other hand, if the rival
runs a positive campaign, the quality assessment of the sponsor of the negative campaign and that
of the target move in opposite directions.
For the case of a fruitful debate (unmatched messages), there are two cases to consider. When
 < c; only the bad type runs a negative campaign: Thus the sponsor of a negative campaign is
hurt and the target benets. When  2 (c; 1   c); the e¤ect is ambiguous since both good and
bad types run negative campaigns. In particular, the attacker in a fruitful debate is revealed to
be good with probability t(), where
t() =
p(G)p(B)
p(G)p(B) + (1  p(G))(1  p(B))
It can be checked that t() > 1
2
if and only if  > 1
2
: Remark 1 sums up the e¤ect of a negative
campaign when the rival uses a positive campaign in equilibrium.
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Remark 1 Suppose in equilibrium, one candidate runs a negative campaign and the rival runs
a positive campaign. The negative campaigner is more likely to win than lose (and the positive
campaigner is more likely to lose than win) if and only if the bad type is rarer, i.e.,  > 1
2
:
Later, we observe in Remark 2 that when  < 1
2
; a random candidate is more likely to run
a negative campaign and when  > 1
2
; he is more likely to run a positive campaign. Therefore,
when a negative campaign is faced with a positive one, the attacker has the advantage if most
candidates are expected to run positive campaigns and the attacker has a disadvantage if most
candidates are expected to go negative. In other words, the candidate using the less expected
mode of campaign has the advantage. PY (Proposition 4) has the opposite nding: When two
candidates choose unmatchedmessages, the one using the dominant mode of campaigning is
at an advantage. The main reason for the di¤erence is that while PY consider only informative
campaigns, we consider softer information that leads to a hide-and-seek framework.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we examine the comparative static properties of the equilibrium for di¤erent levels
of the search cost and average candidate quality, and discuss the implications of such properties.
4.1 Welfare Analysis: Candidate Selection
Looking at political campaigns as debates between candidates with partial information about each
other helps us understand a few important issues about the e¢ ciency of the campaign process
especially in terms of its ability to select the better candidate. The major nding of the model
is that as the prior probability of a candidate being good increases, the probability of a good
candidate being selected through the electoral process may actually go down. Figure 1 plots the
total probability of selection of the good candidate against the prior  for some given search cost
c:11 In the graph, there exist downward jumps in otherwise piecewise continuous and monotonically
increasing graphs. There are three regimes based on ranges of : Full separation, partial separation
and full pooling, and the downwards jumps occur when we move from a more e¢ cient regime to
a less e¢ cient one as the average candidate quality increases. Note also that since an increase in
the search cost favours the bad type, the downward jumps are larger as the cost of information
increases.
11Denote the total probability of selection of the good type given c and  as fc(): It can be deduced from
Proposition 1 that:
fc() =
8<: 2  
2 if  < c
3
2  122   12c2 if c <  < 1  c
 if  > 1  c
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Figure 1: Total probability of selection of a good candidate
The total probability of selection may not fully reect the e¢ ciency of debate as a selection
mechanism. Perhaps a better indicator of the e¢ ciency of debates in selecting the right candidate
would be a measure of how often the good candidate wins when competing against a bad candidate.
Hence we look at the equilibrium probability of a fruitful debate conditional on candidates being
of di¤erent types. Denote this probability (; c): Proposition 2 shows how  changes with the
parameters of the model.
Proposition 2 Suppose one of the two competing candidates is a good type and the other is a bad
type. Debate is always fruitful if  < c; never fruitful if  > 1  c; and if  2 (c; 1  c) debate is
fruitful with a probability (; c) = 1
2
  c2
2(1 ) :
Proof. Follows from proposition 1.
When there is no search, the rarer type has full advantage in the hide-and-seek game. For very
low priors, debate is fully e¢ cient and for very high priors, debate is fully ine¢ cient. When the
prior is moderate, both types search in equilibrium.
In the case when the search cost is very low, i.e., c! 0; we have p(B) and p(G) both converging
to 1
2
: In this case, the debate between the good and bad types reduces to the matching pennies
game in which there is no advantage to either type: Hence each message prole occurs with equal
probability. Then (; c) ! 1
2
for almost all values of the prior. As the search cost increases,
there is a further ine¢ ciency due to di¤erential incentives for search that the two types have.
As mentioned before, we have p(G) < 1
2
< p(B); moreover, both jp(G)   1
2
j and jp(B)   1
2
j are
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increasing in c: This ine¢ ciency due to di¤erential incentives for search leads to a further welfare
loss of c
2
2(1 ) : Figure 2 shows how (; c) changes for di¤erent values of . The bold dashed line
shows  when c! 0:
1
Probability of a
fruitful debate
a
c ½ 1-c 1
½ –2c2
½
Figure 2: Probability of correct selection when two candidates are of di¤erent types
Given an expected candidate quality , if a social planner could choose the search cost c (or
more realistically, the extent of o¢ ce perks), what would the best choice be? The answer depends
on whether the good or the bad type is more common.
If  > 1
2
; we unambiguously improve welfare by reducing c, and the best choice of c would be
as close to zero as possible. On the other hand, if the bad type is more common, there are two
opposing e¤ects. When c < ; a marginal reduction in c reduces the ine¢ ciency due to search and
increases . On the other hand, for any given  less than 1
2
; if we set c > ; we get full separation
of types. Hence, if the bad type is more common, a social planner can achieve full separation by
su¢ ciently reducing the prize from o¢ ce.
4.2 Negative Advertising
Next, we look at the type of messages exchanged in the debate as the prior varies. As the
average candidate quality improves, the ex-ante probability that a candidate will employ a negative
campaign goes down. In general, the bad types propensity to attack goes down as the probability
of the rival being good goes up. For moderate values of the prior, the propensity of negative
campaigning decreases with  because the good types increasing aggressiveness (in searching and
attacking the bad type) is more than compensated by the bad types increasing conservatism (in
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searching and sending positive messages). This is illustrated in gure 3 and stated in Remark 2,
which follows from Proposition 1.12
Probability of a negative
message
a
1
c 1-c
1/2
1/2
Figure 3: Probability of a negative campaign as a function of the prior
Remark 2 The probability of negative advertising is strictly decreasing in the prior for  < 1  c
and is equal to 0 for  > 1  c. Negative advertising is more frequent than positive advertising if
the bad type is more common, and less frequent if the good type is more common.
At this stage, one may want to distinguish between a negative campaign targeted against a
bad type from an attack on a good type, presumably because the latter is likely to be less truthful
than the former. In this model, a good candidate never wages a negative campaign against a good
candidate. A good candidate is subjected to a negative campaign only by a bad candidate that
has not searched.
Just like negative advertising as a whole, the incidence of negative advertising targeted against a
good type goes down as the prior improves.13 The probability of attacks on the good type decreases
with improvement in expected candidate quality because the bad type becomes less common and
also starts searching more often. As the expected candidate quality improves, a growing share
of negative advertising is informed attacks by the good type. In this sense, the share of truth in
negative campaigns goes up as the expected candidate quality improves. Therefore, we have a
cleanerelectorate as the prior increases. However, this also implies that there is less information
revelation through debate and as shown before, the selection performance worsens.
12The probability of a negative message (; c) is: (; c) =
8<: 1   if  < c(1  )  c2 (1  2) if  2 (c; 1  c)
0 if  > 1  c
13The probability of attack on a good type is 1   for  < c; 12 (1  )  c2 if  2 (c; 1  c) and 0 if  > 1  c:
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5 Extensions
Although the hide-and-seek framework discussed in the paper is very simple, it can serve as a
legitimate model of electoral competition. This framework can be extended to discuss several
features necessary for a richer model of politics.
5.1 Probabilistic Information Revelation
Consider a generalization of the model discussed in section 2 and 3 where the quality of the can-
didate is revealed to the voter with a probability dependent on the prole of campaigns employed.
Suppose the revelation of a candidates quality is a Bernoulli random variable distributed inde-
pendently conditional on the campaign prole. If both candidates use positive advertising, each
candidates quality is revealed to the voter independently with probability P ; and similarly, with
probability N if both engage in negative advertising. If, on the other hand, one candidate employs
a positive campaign and the other a negative campaign, then the focal candidates type is revealed
with probability P and the non-focal candidates type with probability N , again, independently
of each other:We call this structure the probabilistic information revelation protocol. We make
two assumptions on the parameters:
(A1) 1  P > N  0
(A2) (1  P )(1  N) < min

(1  P )2; (1  N)2
	
(A1) captures the fact that in a fruitful debate, the quality of a focal candidate is revealed with a
higher probability than that of the non-focal candidate, and (A2) says that the probability that
the voter learns nothing is lower in a fruitful debate than in cross talk.14 First, we demonstrate
that under a probabilistic information revelation protocol, these two assumptions preserve the
incentive structure in the basic framework.
If the types of both candidates are revealed, the voter compares the two and decides. If only
one type is revealed, the voter votes for the candidate if he is revealed to be good and against him
if he is revealed to be bad. If neither type is revealed, the voter votes randomly. In the notation
used in section 2, the payo¤ to the row player from each campaign prole when the two candidates
14Notice that even if we let N = 0; a simple comparison of P and P (or N ) will not allow us to compare the
amount of information revealed in a fruitful debate with that in cross talk. The reason is that while in a cross talk,
each candidates quality is revealed with probability P (or N ) independently, P is the revelation probability
only for the focal candidate.
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are of the same type are as follows:
G-type
P N
P 1 kG-type
N (2-k) 1
B-type
P N
P 1 mB-type
N (2-m) 1
where k = PN+(1 P )(1 N)+2P (1 N) = 1+(P N); and similarly,m = 1 (P N):
Notice that assumption (A1) implies (and is implied by) 1 < k  2 and 0  m < 1: This
ensures that when a good type meets another good type, both nd it strictly dominant to use
positive advertising; and when a bad type meets another bad type, both nd it strictly dominant
to use negative campaigning. Next, consider the game between a good type and a bad type, where
we can nd the row players payo¤s in the individual cells through a little algebra.
B-type
P N
P a1 bG-type
N b a2
where
8><>:
a1 = 2  (1  P )2
a2 = 2  (1  N)2
b = 2  (1  P )(1  N)
Assumption (A2) is equivalent to b > max(a1; a2); which induces the matching pennies structure:
Therefore, when a good type faces a bad type, the former prefers fruitful debate (unmatched
messages) and the latter prefers cross talk (matched messages).
The following proposition describes the equilibrium in the probabilistic revelation case. Under
two additional restrictions, the features of the equilibrium are exactly the same as those in the
deterministic revelation case. Denoting p N by ; we need (i) c < (b a1)
2
(b a1)+ and (ii) b  a1 < .
The rst restriction simply requires the cost of information acquisition to be small enough, and
the second one requires that under fruitful debate, the probability of the revelation of the focal
candidates type is su¢ ciently higher than the probability of revelation of the non-focal candidates
type. The second restriction is always satised if we assume that N = 0; i.e., a fruitful debate
reveals information about the focal candidate only, and not about the non-focal candidate. With
these two restrictions, proposition 1 is a special case of proposition 4.
Proposition 3 Assume (A1); (A2), c < (b a1)
2
(b a1)+ and b   a1 < : The following is the unique
equilibrium for di¤erent values of the prior  :
(i) If  < min

c
b a1 ;
1
2

there is a fully separating equilibrium with no search, i.e., p(G) =
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p(B) = 0; q(G) = 1; q(B) = 0; and (o¤ equilibrium), r(G) = r(B) = 1:
(ii) If c
b a1 <
1
2
; then for  2 ( c
b a1 ; 1   cb a1 ); there is a partially separating equilibrium where
both types search with positive probability, and q(G) = 1; r(G) = 0; q(B) = 0; r(B) = 1;
p(G) = 1
2b (a1+a2)

(b  a1)  c

; and p(B) = 1
2b (a1+a2)

(b  a2) + c1 

:
(iii) If  > max

1  c
b a1 ;
1
2

there is a fully pooling equilibrium on the positive message and
neither type searches, i.e., p(G) = p(B) = 0; q(G) = q(B) = 1; and (o¤ equilibrium),
r(G) = 0; r(B) = 1:
The proof of the proposition is provided in Appendix B. We note here that for the probabilistic
information revelation model, the assumption of passivevoting is no longer innocuous: We need
to assume that voter inference is based only on the arguments made in the campaign and not
additionally on guessing the strategic motivations of candidates for making particular campaign
choices.
5.2 Continuous Type Space
With the deterministic information revelation protocol, we have a natural extension of our model
to the continuous type case. To discuss the continuous type extension we need to formally include
the voter as a third player in the game and discuss her beliefs given candidate strategies and
revealed information. In Appendix A, we discuss voter beliefs and then show that there exists a
class of type-symmetric equilibria of the following kind: There is a cut-o¤ quality  such that
candidates with their type above the cut-o¤ behave like the good type in the discrete model, and
those with type below the cut-o¤ behave like the bad type. There are multiple equilibria, with 
taking any value in an interval. In this class of equilibria, all results in the discrete model carry
over. Moreover, we get an endogenous classication of the continuum of quality into goodand
bad, dictated by voter beliefs.
The continuous type extension is not of mere technical interest. It provides a comparison with
the existing literature on elections as adverse selection mechanisms with one principal (the median
voter) and two competing agents (the candidates). Banks (1990) analyzes Downsian competition
where candidates may make false announcements about their preferred positions, but lying has
an exogenous cost that increases in the distance between their preferred and announced positions.
While Banks nds pooling of candidate types over an interval containing the median voters most
preferred position, Callander and Wilkie (2007) show that if there is a cheap talking type in
the model, pooling happens at two disjoint intervals on either side of the median voters ideal
point. Thus, the best types (those that are preferred most by the median voter) pool in the
former paper while the moderatetypes pool in the latter, and all the other types separate. The
continuous type space in this model can be interpreted as a space of possible candidate locations
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on the Hotelling line, with higher quality implying a location closer to the median voters ideal
position. In the equilibrium in the current model there are two clusters of pooling - one for the
goodtypes and the other for the badtypes. The message in this paper is that if competition
reveals information about only one candidate, it is possible to separate the good set of types from
the bad set of types (where good and bad types are dened endogenously), but one cannot separate
within the good or bad set of types.
It is important to note that there are multiple type-symmetric equilibria in the continuous type
model. We use two renement criteria: (i) better types must obtain weakly higher expected payo¤
in equilibrium and (ii) all types are revealed with positive probability in equilibrium. The rst
criterion is also used in PY, in a stronger form. The second criterion ensures that o¤-equilibrium
beliefs about types play no role in equilibrium behavior. The class of equilibria we identify is the
only one satisfying both these renements and an additional technical restriction.
5.3 Asymmetric strategies
The payo¤ benchmark game described in section 2 has a unique equilibrium where candidates
play type-symmetric strategies. This is an artifact of an assumption embedded in the payo¤
structure: the voter votes for each candidate with equal probability when she is indi¤erent. In
this equilibrium, focality arises only due to the information revelation protocol. However, once we
include the voter as a rational player (as in the game discussed in appendix A), there could be
other equilibria. In these equilibria, the voter treats the two candidates asymmetrically, i.e., votes
for one candidate or the other when indi¤erent. Here, focality arises simply due to players co-
ordinating on one equilibrium or the other. For instance, there exists one equilibrium where neither
candidate searches, candidate 1 uses a positive message irrespective of his type and candidate 2
employs a negative campaign irrespective of his type. This is supported by the o¤-equilibrium
belief that the voter will vote for candidate 1 if she observes cross-talk with positive messages,
and that she will vote for candidate 2 if both employ negative messages.15
5.4 Uninformative Campaigns
In the paper, we have only allowed a candidate the choice to run a campaign about one of two
issues: Own quality (positive campaign) or the rivals quality (negative campaign). Information
is revealed if and only if both candidates focus on the same issue. One might legitimately ask
whether our results would change if a candidate could run a null campaignin which he makes
statements that are informative about neither candidates quality irrespective of whether it is
faced with a positive or a negative campaign.16 In other words, a null campaignwould allow a
candidate to ensure cross-talk unilaterally. The details of the analysis depends on how we model
15We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of enquiry.
16We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension.
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the payo¤s, but the broad message is that it is never in the interest of the good type to use null
campaigns.
First, suppose we extend the benchmark model (with mechanistic voting) presented in section
2 to include null campaigns. An obvious starting assumption is that if either candidate employs
a null campaign (Mi = ), then no information is revealed to the voter about candidate quality.
Under mechanistic voting, the debate payo¤ is shared equally between the two candidates. The
payo¤ to the row player is presented as follows.
P N f
P 1 2 1
N 2 1 1
f 1 1 1
G type
B type
P N f
P 1 2 1
N 0 1 1
f 1 1 1
G type
G type
P N f
P 1 0 1
N 2 1 1
f 1 1 1
B type
B type
Payo¤s with uninformative messages (mechanistic voting)
In this game, for the good type, a positive campaign cannot do any worse than a null campaign
irrespective of what the other candidate does. Therefore, in any equilibrium where a candidate
does not employ a weakly dominated action, a good type will never employ a null campaign. In
equilibrium of this mechanistic voting game, the only type to ever run a null campaign will be the
bad type.
Next, we take a step further and look at the game with a rational voter. In this case, even if no
information is directly revealed by the message prole, the voter can update her belief about the
type of the candidate from the equilibrium strategies given the message prole. The equilibrium
in the rational voter game that mirrors the logic presented in the previous paragraph is simply the
one which replicates the outcome of the binary message game identied in Proposition 1. In this
equilibrium, the voter rationally believes that only the bad type has an incentive to play the null
message. Therefore, whenever a null message is employed against a non-null one, the candidate
using the null message loses the debate. The payo¤ structure in the rational voter game induced
by this belief is given below.
P N f
P 1 2 1
N 2 1 1
f 1 1 1
B type
G type
P N f
P 1 2 2
N 0 1 2
f 0 0 1
G type
G type
P N f
P 1 0 2
N 2 1 2
f 0 0 1
B type
B type
Payo¤s with uninformative messages (rational voting)
It is easy to check that given this payo¤ structure, the equilibrium outcome in Proposition
1 remains unaltered. For an easy intuition, notice that in the normal form, the null message is
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weakly dominated for the good type. Once the null message is eliminated for the good type,
the null message is weakly dominated for the bad type too. Therefore, we have an equilibrium
outcome where the good type nds the null message useless, and the bad type avoids the null
message in order that he is not outedwith certainty. Our result implies that while candidates
may often use uninformative messages, a whole campaign that is composed only of uninformative
statements may not be observed in the real world.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the choice between positive and negative campaigns as a particular case of the
more general decision problem of contradicting the opponents argument (revealing information
through fruitful debate) and raising a di¤erent subject (concealing information through cross talk).
The fundamental idea of the paper is that information transmitted in a debate is conditionally
veriable: The truth of an argument is more transparent when compared with a counter-argument.
Previous formal theoretic work on positive vs. negative advertising has considered only truthful
statements in advertising. Our model incorporates softer information as part of possible messages
spoken in advertising campaigns. The model points out that a lie or ad hominem attack, while
useless to the voter, might be useful to the candidate in muddlingthe debate and thus distracting
the attention of the electorate. The model also shows that, contrary to popular perception, voter
welfare is not monotonic in the expected candidate quality.
The existing body of empirical and experimental work investigating the role of attack messages
has largely proved inconclusive in establishing whether such messages are benecial or harmful.
The current paper suggests that perhaps e¤orts to classify negative campaigns in such exclusive
categories might be misdirected. We present a more nuanced picture in which negative campaigns
may sometimes be useful and sometimes not-so-useful to the voter, depending on the motivation
of the candidate running the campaign. We point out the information is often revealed jointly by
the two candidates discussing two sides of the same issue - and for future work, we might need
to take into account the entire prole of messages in order to set up the right hypotheses to test
with eld or laboratory data.
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7 Appendix A : Rational voter model
In the main body of the paper, the voter is treated as passive . In this section, we include a
rationally updating voter and a more general space of types.
Consider a game G(; F; c) with a voter and two candidates i = 1; 2: Each candidate has a
private quality type i that is drawn independently from a type space   R according to a
common distribution F (): The action space of candidates i = 1; 2 is exactly the same as specied
in Section 2. Formally, this is a three stage game. In stage 1, the candidates observe their
own realized type and choose search action X privately: In stage 2, the candidates play debate
action M 2 fP;Ng: Since action in stage 1 is private, stages 1 and 2 are considered strategically
simultaneous. The (deterministic) information revelation protocol is now formally introduced as
a function R : M2 2 !  [ , which has the following form
R(P; P;) = R(N;N;) = 
R(P;N;) = 1 and R(N;P;) = 2
where  stands for the null set.
In stage 3; the voter observes R(M;) =  2  [  and votes for either candidate, and the
utilities are realized. Assume that if the winning candidates type is ; the voter receives a utility
of : The voters action is vi(); which is the probability of voting for candidate i: The utility
of candidate i from debate is ui(M;) = 2  vi(); i = 1; 2: The total utility of the candidate,
as before, is the utility from winning the debate less the search cost c 2 (0; 1
2
). Our equilibrium
concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
7.1 Voter and candidate strategies
In the game G, the voter rationally forms beliefs about candidate types based on information 
and M: However, the structure of the game is such that the only thing that matters for ranking
the candidates is  and not M: Suppose the expected type of candidate i is (ij): Since this
is also the expected utility from a candidate when he is elected, the voter compares (1j) and
(2j) and votes for whichever is higher.
We assume that the voter treats both candidates symmetrically, i.e., whenever (1j) =
(2j); the voter randomizes with equal probabiity between the two candidates.17
If  = ; both candidates are playing the same action. Since the candidates are playing
symmetric strategies, the voter cannot distinguish between the two. Hence, (1j) = (2j);
and therefore vi() = 12 : If  = i; the type of candidate i is known to be i while ( iji) is
inferred by the voter either by Bayes Rule from equilibrium strategies or by out-of-equilibrium
17If this restriction on voter beliefs is relaxed, there can be other equilibria. We provide an example of such an
equilibrium in section 5.3.
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beliefs. Hence, the called rational voting strategies are:
vi (i) =
8><>:
1 if i > ( iji)
0 if i < ( iji)
1
2
if i = ( iji)
(4)
vi () =
1
2
The strategy space is dened by the functions pi(); qi() and ri(; 
0) as mentioned in section
3: Note that this set-up can handle any type space of reasonable generality. First, consider a
binary type space.
7.2 Binary Type space
Suppose that there are only two types: Good (G) and Bad (B). In formal terms,  = fG;Bg;
where G and B are two real numbers with G > B: The distribution F () now becomes Bernoulli,
with the prior Pr(i = G) =  2 (0; 1) for i = 1; 2: It is shown here that for a natural specication
of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the game G(fG;Bg; ; c) has the same unique symmetric equilibrium
as the gameH(; c) discussed in the main body of the paper18. To demonstrate that, we show that
for game G(fG;Bg; ; c), rational voting strategy is the same as passive voting strategy considered
in H, and therefore leads to the same outcome. Dene passive voting strategy as
vi() =
8><>:
1 if  = i = G
0 if  = i = B
1
2
if  = 
Assume that if i 2 fG;Bg is revealed out of equilibrium in a debate, then the voter assumes
that both types G and B of candidate  i have small positive probabilities G and B of having
deviated and played N: This implies that o¤ the equilibrium path,
B < ( iji) < G; i 2 fG;Bg (5)
Next, note that in game H; for action proles that constitute the equilibrium, whenever any type
 of candidate i is revealed, there is a positive probability of both types G and B of candidate
 i to have attacked candidate i: Hence, along the equilibrium path too, by Bayes rule, we must
have condition (5) satised: The next Lemma established this fact more generally for the game
G(fG;Bg; ; c) :
18To be exact, these games are specifed di¤erently, so the equilibria can never be the same. What we mean is
that in equilibrium, the candidate and voter behaviour are the same in both games.
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Lemma 2 In the game G(fG;Bg; ; c); there is no symmetric equilibrium where for some type
i 2 fG;Bg; we have ( iji) = i:
Proof. In Appendix B.
From Lemma 2, we have for any equilibrium strategy prole of the game G(fG;Bg; ; c)
B < ( iji) < G; i 2 fG;Bg (6)
Conditions (5) and (6) imply that if  = fG;Bg; we must have
( iji) > i if i = B
( iji) < i if i = G
From (4); the rational voting strategy supporting any equilibrium of G; on and o¤ the equilibrium
path, is:
vi() =
8><>:
1 if  = i = G
0 if  = i = B
1
2
if  = 
Hence, passive voting is rational here. Therefore, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Assuming that the voter randomizes with equal probability whenever indi¤erent,
and given the out-of-equilibrium beliefs stated in (5); the solution to G(fG;Bg; ; c) is the same as
the solution to the game H(; c):
7.3 Continuous Type Space
This section demonstrates that all the results proved in the case of the binary type space extend
naturally to a case where quality can vary over a continuum. Moreover, the continuum breaks
into a goodset and a badset endogenously.
Normalize the type space  and consider it to be the unit interval [0; 1]: Suppose F () is a
non-atomic prior distribution from which  is drawn. Assume that F () has full support over .
Note that voter inference in this case is non-trivial. If some candidate is revealed to be of type
 2 (0; 1); then the attacker potentially can be of a type that is strictly better, equal or strictly
worse. In the two-type model, both types were extreme - and therefore revelation of one type was
enough for the voter to decide. What is interesting is that in the continuous model too, there is
a class of equilibria in which rational voting looks very much like passive voting.
In this case, we restrict attention to type-symmetric strategies. The strategy functions p(); q()
and r(; 0) are dened in the same way as in Section 3; except that these are functions over [0; 1]
- assume them to be continuous except at a nite number of points.
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Next, dene h(; 0) as the probability of the event that conditional on candidates of types 
and 0 respectively, the one with type  employs campaign P . This is the equivalent of P0 as
dened in (1) in the discrete set-up. Formally,
h(; 0) = (1  p())q() + p()r(; 0);where ; 0 2 [0; 1]2 (7)
Using (7); dene g(; 0) as the probability that type  is revealed through a fruitful debate against
type 0: In other words, g(; 0) is the probability of the event that conditional on type  facing
type 0, type  uses P and type 0 uses N:
g(; 0) = h(; 0) (1  h(; 0)) ; where ; 0 2 [0; 1]2 (8)
Next, dene e() as the expected type of candidate  i when candidate i has been revealed to be
of type : Formally, e() = ( iji = ): When a type  is revealed in equilibrium with positive
probability, using (8); e() can be calculated as:
e() =
1R
0
0g(; 0)dF (0)
1R
0
g(; 0)dF (0)
; when
1R
0
g(; 0)dF (0) > 0 (9)
If some type  is not revealed in equilibrium with a positive probability, then e() has to be
determined by an appropriate specication of out of equilibrium beliefs.
Signaling games with continuous types often admit multiple equilibria. Both Banks (1990) and
Callander and Wilkie (2005) use the renement of universal divinity to select equilibria. Here, the
main interest is in the link between passive and rational beliefs, and specically in the existence
of equilibria that can be supported by passive beliefs. To avoid equilibria that are too dependent
on beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, assume the following restriction on the set of equilibria:
In equilibrium, all types  2  should be revealed with positive probability, i.e.,
1R
0
g(; 0)dF (0) > 0 for all  2  (10)
This guarantees that e() is dened by (9) for all :
Given any symmetric strategy prole p(); q() and r(; 0), separate the type space into disjoint
sets G;fM and B such that
G = f : e() < g
B = f : e() > g
M = f : e() = g
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If in a fruitful debate, a type is revealed to belong toG (B); then the rival is strictly worse (better)
in expectation. Therefore, given any symmetric strategy prole, any equilibrium of the continuous
type game will be of the following kind: The type space will be partitioned into sets G;B andM
such that in a fruitful debate, a candidate revealed to be in G wins and a candidate revealed to
be in B loses. Since we are looking for equilibria that are similar to those in the two-type case,
consider equilibria wherefM is a collection of a nite number of points, and thus has measure zero.
Hence, our next restriction on the set of equilibria is
Pr( : e() = ) = 0 (11)
Hence, if there is an equilibrium of the continuous type game with restriction (11); it would
look like the equilibrium with binary types and passive strategies.
To put more structure on the set of equilibria, consider another restriction. This restriction
is not necessary for the existence of binary equilibria with passive voting strategies. However, it
selects equilibria among those with such strategies that lead to a naturalinterpretation of good
and bad. This is a weaker form of the monotonicity restriction in PY.19 Dene the expected utility
in equilibrium for type  of player i as Ui(); and stipulate that in equilibrium a type must not
have a strictly greater expected utility than a higher type, i.e.,
For ; 0 2 2;  < 0 ) Ui()  Ui(0) (12)
Proposition 5 is a formal statement of the existence and characterization of equilibria in the contin-
uous type case satisfying the above restrictions. It demonstrates that the type space endogenously
breaks into two sets which conform to the natural denition of good and bad, and that the
equilibrium with the binary type space is replicated. There is a cut-o¤ type above which all types
are deemed to be goodand below which all types are deemed to be bad. Note however that
this cuto¤ type is not unique. In fact, any threshold in the range (F 1(c); F 1(1   c)) can serve
as the cut-o¤ type Thus, it is possible that in two electorates where the prior distributions from
which the two candidates are drawn are exactly the same, the denition of a good candidate and
a bad candidate are di¤erent. Comparative static conclusions are di¢ cult to draw because of the
multiplicity of equilibria, but it can be said that the supportable set of cut-o¤ types expands as
the search cost decreases.
Proposition 5 Consider any  such that c < F () < 1   c; and dene sets G =f :  > g
and B =f :  < g. Then the following is an equilibrium in type-symmetric strategies obeying
19Polborn and Yi (2006) assumes that expected utility strictly increases in type - here weak monotonicity is
assumed.
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restrictions (10); (11) and (12) :
p() =
(
p(G) if  2 G
p(B) if  2 B
q() =
(
q(G) if  2 G
q(B) if  2 B
r(; 0) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if  2 G; 0 2 G
r(G) if  2 G; 0 2 B
r(B) if  2 B; 0 2 G
0 if  2 B; 0 2 B
where, if  = 1   F (); the quantities p(G); p(B); q(G); q(B); r(G) and r(B) are given by
Proposition 1 part (ii): Moreover, no other equilibrium in the class of type-symmetric strategies
satises all the three restrictions (10); (11) and (12):
Proof. Suppose rst voters behave passively by voting in favor of a candidate revealed to be of
type greater than , against a candidate revealed to be of type less than  and with probability 1
2
for each candidate when neithers type is revealed. Then, from the point of view of the candidates,
we have the same game as we would have in the two-type case, with all types in G = f :  > g
behaving like type G and all types in B = f :  < g behaving like type B: Since the probability
of a candidates type being in G is 1   F () =  2 (c; 1   c); the unique equilibrium candidate
behavior given passive voting strategy is going to be the same as is described by Proposition 1
part (ii):
To see that passive voting is rational, notice that in the said equilibrium of the two-type case,
there is fruitful debate only between di¤erent types. Therefore, if a type is revealed to be  > ;
i.e.,  2 G; the rivals type must satisfy  2 B; i.e.,  < : Clearly, if  2 G; then the expected
type of the rival is e() = E(j 2 B) <  < : Similarly, if a type is revealed to be  2 B; then
the expected type of the rival is e() = E(j 2 G) >  > : Therefore, passive voting is indeed
rational in equilibrium.
It is easy to see that all types are revealed with positive probability and Pr( 2M) = Pr( =
) = 0. Thus, restrictions (10) and (11) are satised. Moreover, notice that if there is any
equilibrium satisfying these two restrictions, it must be the case that all types in G should get
strictly higher expected utility than all types in B:Moreover, two types inG (and two types in B)
should get equal expected utility. The only way to satisfy restriction (??) then is to have a cut-o¤
equilibrium where all types above a threshold belong to G and all types below a threshold belong
to B: In other words, the above class of equilibria is the only class among symmetric equilibria
that satises all three restrictions.
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8 Appendix B: Proofs Omitted from the Main Text
To dene the equilibrium strategies in this setting, some basic notation needs to be introduced.
Denote a pure strategy for player i by si = (p(); q() and r(; )); i = 1; 2: Next, dene
Eui (M js i; I) as the expected utility from debate to type  2 fG;Bg of player i from play-
ing message M 2 fP;Ng when player  i is using strategies s i; and the information available
to player i is I 2 fG;B; g: If there is search and the type of the rival ( i) is known by i then
I = G or I = B; else, I = : This expected utility is constructed from the debate payo¤ ui(M;),
taking expectation over the possible messages of the rival  i and if the rival type is not known,
then over possible types of the rival too. Dene as Eui (mjs i; I) the expected utility when type
 of player i plays message P with a probability m 2 [0; 1]:
Dene EU i (Sjs i) = E(0)
"
arg max
m2[0;1]
Eui (mjs i; 0)
#
  c as the expected utility from search,
taking into account the optimal message choice post search, and taking expectation over rival
types and EU i (NS;mjs i) = Eui (mjs i; ) as the expected utility from not searching and playing
a mix m of messages.
When a candidate of type  knows that his rival is also of type ; then the candidate has a
strictly dominant message. Denote this message by D(): In other words, D(G) = P and D(B) =
N: Denote by D() the other available action in the message space, i.e. D() = fP;NgnD(): In
the same way, denote by  the type di¤erent from ; i.e.,  = fG;Bgn:
We shall rst prove a few results in the form of claims and use those results to nd the
equilibrium strategies for di¤erent parameter values.
Claim 1 Eui (D()js i; )  Eui (D()js i; ) = 1
Proof. For  = G; D() = P; and D() = N
EuGi (P js i; G)  EuGi (N js i; G) = fP i(G;G) + 2(1  P i(G;G))g   f(1  P i(G;G)g = 1
For  = B; D() = N; and D() = P
EuBi (N js i; B)  EuBi (P js i; B) = f(1  P i(B;B)) + 2P i(B;B)g   P i(B;B) = 1
The above claim establishes that type  nds it strictly dominant to use message D() when
he knows that the rival is of type :
Claim 2 If pi() > 0; we must have Eui (D()js i; ) < Eui (D()js i; )
Proof. Suppose not. Hence, Eui (D()js i; )  Eui (D()js i; ):
Since pi() > 0; we must have
EU i (Sjs i)  max

EU i (NS;P js i); EU i (NS;N js i)

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Using claim 1; we can rewrite this as
Pr()Eui (D()js i; ) + Pr() max
h
Eui (D()js i; ); Eui (D()js i; )
i
  c
> max
h
EUi(NS;D()js i); EU i (NS;D()js i)
i
From our supposition,
LHS = Pr()Eui (D()js i; ) + Pr()Eui (D()js i; )  c
= EU i (NS;D()js i)  c
Now, RHS = max
(
Pr()Eui (D()js i; ) + Pr()Eui (D()js i; );
Pr()Eui (D()js i; ) + Pr()Eui (D()js i; )
)
By claim 1 and our supposition, RHS = EU i (NS;D()js i) > EU i (NS;D()js i) c = LHS;
which is a contradiction.
The above claim establishes that whenever there is search with a positive probability, type 
uses message D() when he knows that the rival is of type : Claims 1 and 2 determine what
actions will be played by a type when the rival type is known. Note that the choice of message
post search is independent of the strategy of the rival type. Thus,
EU i (Sjs i) = Pr()Eui (D()js i; ) + Pr()Eui (D()js i; )  c (13)
Claim 3 EU i (Sjs i)  EU i (NS;D()js i) = Pr()  c
Proof. By equation (13), EU i (Sjs i)  EU i (NS;D()js i) equals
Pr()
h
Eui (D()js i; )  Eui (D()js i; )
i
+ Pr()
h
Eui (D()js i; )  Eui (D()js i; )
i
  c
By claim 1; the above expression equals Pr()  c
Note that c =  or c = 1    are not considered in our range of parameter values. Thus,
between search and no search with D(); one always strictly dominates the other, based on the
values of the parameter. Most importantly, if type  searches with positive probability, he will
not play the message D() conditional on not searching. If the probability of search is strictly
between 0 and 1; then D() will be played by  conditional on playing action X = NS:
Claim 4 EU i (Sjs i)  EU i (NS;D()js i) = Pr()(2P i(; )  1)  c
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Proof. By equation (13), EU i (Sjs i)  EU i (NS;D()js i) equals:
Pr()

Eui (D()js i; )  Eui (D()js i; )

+ Pr()
h
Eui (D()js i; )  Eui (D()js i; )
i
  c
By simple algebra, the above expression equals Pr()(2P i(; )  1)  c.
This claim, along with claim 3, establishes that when there is search by type  of player i; we
must have Pr()(2P i(; ) 1)  c  0: If there is indi¤erence between search and no search, then
the inequality must be satised as an equality. Note that this depends on the strategy of the rival
candidate.
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
When the rival is known to be bad, the expected payo¤of type G from using P is P i(B;G)+2(1 
P i(B;G))  c; and that from using message N is 2P i(B;G) + (1 P i(B;G))  c: Thus, the net
gain from using P instead of N is (1  2P i(B;G)); which is strictly positive if P (B;G) < 12 and
negative if P i(B;G) > 12 : This proves the rst part of (a):When the rival is unknown, the payo¤to
type G from message P is fP i(G;G)+2(1 P i(G;G))g+(1 )fP i(B;G)+2(1 P i(B;G))g
and that from playing N is f(1 P i(G;G))g+ (1 )f2P i(B;G) + (1 P i(B;G))g; and the
gain from playing P instead of N is [1  2(1  )P i(B;G)] ; and the second part of (a) follows.
The proof of (b) is similar.
With the four basic claims and Lemma 1, we can nd the equilibrium, i.e., prove proposition
1.
8.2 Proof of proposition 1
Part (i):  < c
By claim 4,  < c) EUBi (Sjs i) < EUBi (NS;N js i)
By claim 3, 1   > c) EUBi (Sjs i) > EUBi (NS;P js i)
Thus, for type B of either player, using the negative message and not searching strictly domi-
nates other strategies.
Hence, pi(B) = qi(B) = 0) Pi(B;G) = 0 for i = 1; 2. By Lemma 1 part (a), qi(G) = ri(G) =
1
Also, for each i; P i(B;G) = 0 implies
EUGi (Sjs i)  EUGi (NS;P js i) =  (1  )  c < 0) pi(G) = 0:
Part (iii):  > 1  c
By claim 4, 1   < c) EUGi (Sjs i) < EUGi (NS;P js i)
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By claim 3,  > c) EUGi (Sjs i) > EUGi (NS;N js i)
Thus, for type G of either player, using the positive message while not searching strictly
dominates other strategies.
Hence, pi(G) = 0 and qi(G) = 1) Pi(G;B) = 1: By Lemma 1 part (b), qi(B) = ri(B) = 1:
By claim 2, ri(B) = 1 ) pi(B) = 0
Part (ii): c <  < 1  c
Here, min(; 1  ) > c: Therefore, by claim 3, for  2 fG;Bg;
EU i (Sjs i)  EU i (NS;D()js i) > 0:
Thus, whenever the actionNS is played by type  with positive probability, D() is the message
employed, or
pi(G) < 1) qi(G) = 1 and pi(B) < 1) qi(B) = 0 (14)
Next, we claim that we cannot have search with certainty for either type.
Claim 5 For  2 (1  c; c); we cannot have pi() = 1 in equilibrium for any  for i = 1 or i = 2:
Proof. Suppose c <  < 1   c and pi(G) = 1: Therefore, Pi(G;B) = ri(G); and by Claim 2,
ri(G) = 0: This implies by 1 that r i(B) = q i(B) = 0 ) P i(B;G) = 0 (by Lemma 1). Using
this in claim 4, we have a contradiction, since
EUGi (Sjs i)  EUGi (NS;P js i) =  (1  )  c < 0) pi(G) = 0:
This establishes that we cannot have pi(G) = 1 in equilibrium for any i 2 f1; 2g if  2 (1  c; c):
Next, suppose that pi(B) = 1: By Claim 2, we have ri(B) = 1; implying Pi(B;G) = 1: By
claim 4, this implies that
EUG i(Sjsi)  EUG i(NS;P jsi) = (1  )  c > 0
In addition to claim 3 that EUG i(Sjs i)   EUG i(NS;P js i) > 0; this implies that p i(G) = 1:
But we have just seen that this cannot be true in equilibrium.
Equation (14) and claim 5 together establish that in equilibrium with c <  < 1  c; we must
have q(G) = 1 and q(B) = 0: Using this in claim 4 and Lemma 1, we can show similarly that
neither type will have p() = 0: Therefore, we must have pi() 2 (0; 1) for both types  2 fG;Bg
and for both players i = 1; 2. By claim 2, ri(B) = 1 and ri(G) = 0:
Also, from claim 4, we must have for indi¤erence between search and no search for type ,
Pr()(2Pi(; )  1) = c) Pi(; ) = 1
2

1 +
c
Pr()

Since Pi(B;G) = pi(B) and P (G;B) = 1  pi(G); we are done.
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8.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose the assertion is false, and we have ( iji = G) = G: This must be on the equilibrium
path due to assumption (5) on o¤-equilibrium beliefs. Therefore, we have vi(G) = 12 by assumption:
This implies that irrespective of the message prole, whenever two good types meet, they both get
a debate utility of 1: This implies that X = S is strictly dominated. To see that, suppose the good
type of a candidate plays a mix mB of messages against the bad type and mG of messages against
the good type conditional on search. Since any strategy against the good type of the rival fetches
a payo¤ of 1; the candidate can be better o¤ (by an amount c) by not searching and employing a
mix mB:
Now, for ( iji = G) = G to be true in equilibrium we need the good type to have fruitful
debate with good type with positive probability, i.e., Pi(G;G) 2 (0; 1) for both i: Moreover, type
B should never reveal type G; which happens when either Pi(B;G) = 1 or Pi(G;B) = 0 for both
i:
Since pi(G) = 0; Pi(G;G) = Pi(G;B) = qi(G): Since Pi(G;G) > 0; we can rule out Pi(G;B) =
0: Therefore, we must have Pi(B;G) = 1: If Pi(B;G) = 1; we must have q i(G) = 0; i.e.,
P i(G;G) = 0; which is a contradiction.
Thus, it is established that we cannot have ( iji = G) = G in equilibrium. In the same
fashion, we can show that we cannot have ( iji = B) = B in any equilibrium with rational
voting.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of this proposition is exactly similar to that of proposition 1, except that the relevant
expressions are di¤erent. Hence we only provide the sketch of the proof.
The result equivalent to Lemma 1 is as follows
Lemma 3 (1.1) For  2 fG;Bg, the message choice by type  conditional on not searching (i.e.,
q), and the message choice conditional on searching and nding the rival type to be di¤erent (i.e.,
r), is given by:
(a) On nding the rival to be a bad type, the good type uses a positive message (ri(G) = 1) or a
negative message (ri(G) = 0) depending on
P i(B;G) 7
b  a2
2b  (a1 + a2)
Conditional on not searching, the good type employs a positive message (qi(G) = 1) or a
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negative message (qi(G) = 0) depending on
P i(B;G) 7
b  a2 + Pr(G)Pr(B)
2b  (a1 + a2)
(b) On nding the rival to be a good type, the bad type uses a positive message (ri(B) = 1) or a
negative message (ri(B) = 0) depending on
P i(G;B) ?
b  a2
2b  (a1 + a2)
: Conditional on not searching, the bad type employs a positive message (qi(B) = 1) or a
negative message (qi(B) = 0) depending on
P i(G;B) ?
b  a2 + Pr(B)Pr(G)
2b  (a1 + a2) :
The generalized results corresponding to the four claims are as follows
Claim 6 Eui (D()js i; )  Eui (D()js i; ) =  > 0
Claim 7 If pi() > 0; we must have Eui (D()js i; ) < Eui (D()js i; )
Claim 8 EU i (Sjs i)  EU i (NS;D()js i) = Pr()  c
Claim 9 EU i (Sjs i)  EU i (NS;D()js i) = Pr()[

P i(2b  (a1 + a2)
	  (b  a2)]  c
As corollary to claim 9, we have
 <
c
b  a1 ) EU
B
i (Sjp; q; r) < EUBi (NS;N jp; q; r) (15)
1   < c
b  a1 ) EU
G
i (Sjp; q; r) < EUGi (NS;P jp; q; r) (16)
Proof of part (i) of proposition:  < c
b a1 and  <
1
2
By equation (15); EUBi (Sjs i) < EUBi (NS;N js i): Since   b  a1; we have c  cb a1 < 12 <
1   : By claim 8, EUBi (Sjs i) > EUBi (NS;P js i): Therefore, pi(B) = qi(B) = 0 ) Pi(B;G) =
0) qi(G) = ri(G) = 1 (By Lemma 3). Also, P i(B;G) = 0) pi(G) = 0 by claim 9.
Proof of part (iii) of proposition:  > 1  c
b a1 and  >
1
2
By equation (16); EUGi (Sjs i) < EUGi (NS;P js i): Since   b   a1; we have 1    < 12 <
1   c
b a1  1   c )  > c : By claim 8, EUGi (Sjs i) > EUGi (NS;N js i): Therefore, pi(G) =
0; qi(G) = 1) Pi(G;B) = 1) ri(B) = 1 (By Lemma 3). By Lemma 3, we also have qi(B) = 1
only if 2b   (a1 + a2)  1   + (b   a2); i.e.,   (b a1)+ : Now, c <
(b a1)2
(b a1)+ ) 1   cb a1 >
1  b a1
(b a1)+ =

(b a1)+ : Therefore,  > 1  cb a1 ) qi(B) = 1
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Proof of part (ii) of proposition: c
b a1 <  < 1  cb a1
Since b   a1  ; we have  > cb a1  c : By claim 8, EUGi (Sjs i) > EUGi (NS;N js i):
Therefore, pi(G) < 1 ) qi(G) = 1: Again,  < 1   cb a1  1   c ) 1    > c : By claim 8,
EUBi (Sjs i) > EUBi (NS;P js i): Therefore, pi(B) < 1) qi(B) = 0:
The following claim establishes uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Claim 10 There is no equilibrium with pi() = 1 for any i and any :
Proof. Already shown for  > 1  c
b a1 and  <
c
b a1 : Now, consider the case with
c
b a1 <  < 1 
c
b a1 : Suppose pi(G) = 1 for some i: Then Pi(G;B) = ri(G):Also, ri(G) = 0 by Claim 7. By Lemma
3, r i(B) = q i(B) = 0 ) P i(B;G) = 0. By Claim 8, EUGi (Sjs i) < EUGi (NS;N js i) )
pi(G) = 0 (Contradiction). Next, suppose, pi(B) = 1: By claim 7, Pi(B;G) = ri(B) = 1: By
Claim 9, EUG i(Sjsi)   EUG i(NS;P jsi) = (1   )(b   a1)   c > 0; since  < 1   cb a1 : Thus,
p i(G) = 1; which cannot occur in equilibrium, as we just saw before.
Claim 10 implies that qi(G) = 1 and qi(B) = 0 whenever cb a1 <  < 1   cb a1 : Similarly,
we can show that we cannot have pi() = 0 in equilibrium for  2 fG;Bg whenever cb a1 <
 < 1   c
b a1 :.Therefore, for this range of , we must have pi() 2 (0; 1): Also, from claim 7,
Pi(B;G) = pi(B) and Pi(G;B) = 1  pi(G):
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